Censorship : the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 : the balancing act by Barry, Elsie M.
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
B279_ 
1995 
ELSIE M. BARRY 
CENSORSHIP: THE FILMS, VIDEOS, AND 
PUBLICATIONS CLASSIFICATION ACT 1993 - THE 
BALANCING ACT 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
ADVANCED PUBLIC LAW (LAWS 545) 
LAW FACULTY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
1995 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY OF 
WELLINGTON 
Te Whare Wananga 
o te Upoko o te Ika a Maui 
LIBRARY 
CONTENTS 
I ABSTRACT AND WORD LENGTH 
A Abstract 
B Statement on Word Length 
II CONCLUSIONS 
III BACKGROUND 
A Philosophical views 
1 Liberalism 
2 Conservatism 
3 Feminism 
B Purpose of the Act 
1 One test 
2 Specifying what should be banned and what scrutinised 
3 Concerns about how women are portrayed in pornography 
4 Display conditions 
C Act Covers More than Pornography 
D Government Publications Relating to the Act 
E Freedom of Expression 
1 International obligations 
2 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
3 Canadian case law 
2 
CONTENTS (CONT'D) 
IV THE BALANCE BETWEEN HARM AND OFFENCE 
A The Act is one Part of Censorship in New Zealand 
1 Marketplace censorship 
2 State censorship of immoral conduct 
3 Bodies related to the censorship function 
B The Symbolism of State Censorship and the Test of Harm 
C Section 3: Harm 
1 Section 3 in relation to the Act as a whole 
2 The structure of section 3 
3 Interpreting section 3 - the meaning of injurious 
(a) The distinction between harm and offence 
(b) Standards required in lieu of proof of harm 
(i) Proof of harm 
(ii) Requirement for standards in section 3 
(c) Nature of community standards 
(i) Tolerance not taste 
(ii) Relationship between tolerance and harm 
(iii) Contemporary standards 
(iv) Average person 
(v) Community that cares 
(vi) Community defined geographically 
(d) Establishing standards 
(e) What amounts to injurious 
(i) Wording of section 3 
(ii) Morality disguised as harm 
(iii) Section 3 - promotes or supports has liberal elements 
(iv) Feminist concerns of discrimination are in the harm test 
(v) Section 3(4)(a) - dominant effect 
(vi) Impact of the medium 
D Offence - Display 
E Broadcasting - The Inconsistencies between Harm and Good Taste 
1 New technology 
2 Broadcasting 
I 
j 
CONTENTS (CONT'D) 
V THE BALANCE BETWEEN FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND 
FREEDOM FROM HARM 
A International Instruments and Selected Countries 
1 International instruments 
2 Selected countries 
(a) Canada 
(b) United States 
(c) New Zealand 
B The Influence of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Act 
1 No influence if classification decisions are based on the Act 
(a) Prescribed by law 
(b) Reasonable and demonstrably justified 
2 The influence of international bodies - the possession offence 
(a) Significance for section 131 of objectionable under section 3 
(b) Possession for a purpose not required 
(c) Lack of knowledge not a defence 
(d) Significance of reporting to international bodies 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
APPENDIX 
4 
I ABSTRACT AND WORD LENGTH 
A Abstract 
This paper analyses the balance of liberal, feminist, and conservative interests that 
underlies the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 by exploring 
the balance between harm and offence that exists in the Act. In doing so, this paper 
cites case law to show that because a causal relationship between harm and material 
perceived to be harmful cannot be proved, community standards of tolerance are 
required to gauge harm. This paper concludes that the principle provides the basis 
within a rationale of harm for censoring publications which subordinate women, and 
also provides a basis for more censorship rather than less censorship. 
This paper also explores the limited relationship that exists between the Act and the 
Broadcasting Act 1989 (which reflects conservative interests) and concludes that in 
the interests of consistency there is scope for some rationalisation of that 
relationship. 
This paper also explores the balance that exists in the Act between freedom of 
expression and freedom from harm using a New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
analysis and concludes that that the influence of that Act on the Films, Videos, and 
Publications Classification Act 1993 is likely to be limited and therefore will not 
have a liberalising effect on the Act, ie will not lead to less censorship. 
B Statement on Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography, and 
appendix) comprises approximately 15,000 words. 
II 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
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II CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Act can be analysed in terms of the balance between harm and offence. The 
basis of the Act is on avoiding harm, (which imposes less censorship than if it were 
based on offence) whereas other aspects of censorship in New Zealand tend to focus 
on offence. The Act is the result of much public consultation and imposes the level 
of censorship that the public wants. 
2. The focus of the Act is on the status of a publication and this is a possible factor in 
the symbolism associated with censorship of publications and a reason for the 
imposition of less censorship. 
3. Harm appears to be a sound test because it requires censors to focus on the least 
amount of censorship and this is consistent with democratic principles. The test has 
been used in New Zealand since 1963, is able to accommodate changing standards, 
and is supported by recent Canadian case law. It avoids definitions of pornography 
and in doing so requires a judgment about the publication to be made. It avoids the 
debate about whether pornography and such material is a symptom or a cause of a 
social problem. It is unlikely that this test will be changed. 
4. Standards against which to gauge harm are required because harm cannot be 
proved. This link between harm, standards and proof is stated in Canadian case law 
and applies when interpreting the Act. The principle is able to accommodate liberal 
concerns (based on harm) and feminist concerns (based on the subordination of 
women with its difficulty of proving subordination and effect on attitudes towards 
women). It provides a basis from which the new terms in the Act ("degrading", 
"dehumanising" and "demeaning") can be interpreted. It can accommodate 
pornography and other kinds of material perceived to be harmful. It provides a 
rationale within the harm principle for more censorship rather than less censorship. 
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The accommodation of feminist concerns has come about in a context of the 
availability of harder pornography due to technology, and in the context of women's 
changing role in society. 
5. Standards are of tolerance (not taste), are contemporary and are those of the 
average New Zealander who cares. The Act through its two tier structure specifies 
what the community currently perceives to be harmful. Changing standards could 
lead to future amendment to some extent. 
6. Display of publications is new and is based on offence but the Act follows its focus 
on harm through to display in that such publications must first be classified as 
harmful to the community if made available to persons outside of a restricted class 
(such as children) before they can be considered offensive for the purposes of 
display. Two purposes of display conditions are therefore protection and avoidance 
of offence. 
7. Any major change to the Act will likely come from legislative methods adopted to 
regulate new technology coupled with the perceptions of the community of the harm 
arising from that technology. 
The Broadcasting Act 1989 and the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification 
Act 1993 have different tests yet often have to deal with similar issues. There is 
scope for the two to be rationalised. 
8. The Act can also be analysed in terms of the balance between freedom of expression 
and freedom from harm using a New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 analysis. 
However the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is unlikely to overturn 
classification decisions that are based on the statutory criteria. In other words, it is 
unlikely that its effect will be to impose a more liberal interpretation on the Act. 
9. 
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However, the views of the United Nations Human Rights Committee may be 
persuasive in changing the Act itself, ie in changing the possession offence. 
7 
Overall, the Act is a mix of liberalism, conservatism, and feminism. It is liberal in 
that explicit sex per se between adults intended to sexually arouse is not banned, 
publications may contain some elements that fall short of harm, children as in 
previous legislation are attempted to be protected with restricted classifications, 
offence from display is attempted to be avoided, and there is provision for consumer 
advice in relations to films and videos. It is conservative in that certain material is 
banned outright and proof is not required. It is feminist in that feminist concerns are 
recognised and proof is not required. 
10. Censorship issues in New Zealand bear a significant similarity to censorship issues in 
jurisdictions similar to New Zealand How they are dealt with in those jurisdictions 
influence how they are dealt with in New Zealand. 
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III BACKGROUND 
A Philosophical views 
The Report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry which preceded the Films, 
Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 (the Act) 1 saw merit in each of the 
three views of liberalism (tolerance for diversity), conservatism (dignity and values), 
and feminism (empowerment and equality). 
l Liberalism 
The Committee outlined the liberal view as freedom of individuals to act within the 
open marketplace of ideas as being the best way to truth and wisdom. Balanced 
against this was the view of J. S. Mill who argued that "the only purpose for which 
power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others."2 
However, the Committee noted that in the twentieth century, truth will not 
necessarily rise above untruth in an environment in which the need to make a profit 
rules and further noted:3 
Such considerations do not invalidate the central tenets of liberal faith but they do help lo 
modify its application. Thus most liberals now accept that the law ..................... may be 
used lo see that the marketing of pornography does not cause involuntary offence to the 
public; that it may be used lo protect children; and that it may be used through 
classification lo give education and consumer advice to the public ................... Beyond this, 
1 Report of the Ministerial Commillee of Inquiry into Pornography (January 1989) otherwise known as the 
Morris Report, 55-61. 
2 As quoted in the Morris Report (January 1989) 18. 
3 Seen 1, 56. 
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liberals require that any demonstration sufficient to constrain freedom must rest on 
empirical evidence and statistical probability. 
9 
2 Conservatism 
3 
The Committee outlined the conservative view as moral values (being those which 
express the accumulated wisdom of the majority and which have stood the test of 
time) being embodied in the law, otherwise society will disintegrate. 
The Committee noted:4 
Conservatives believe that the State may properly act to prevent personal immorality when it 
offends the sense of decency of the majority. In this the law has a symbolic function of 
setting the limits of tolerance by proscribing what is unaccepable to common morality. 
Conservatives believe that both children and adults need protection. 
Feminism 
The Committee outlined this in relation to pornography as ~erpetuating i equalities 
between the sexes by portraying men's power over women. 
The Committee noted:5 
The emphasis on men's vision of women as defining how women are in a society where 
men have control brings this feminist analysis to define the harm of pornography differently 
from liberals. The latter see pornography as acceptable unless giving rise to considerable 
harm, such as leading men lo commit sex crimes. The feminist perspective sees 
pornography as harming women both indirectly, through male behaviour, and directly, 
through its pervasive definition of how women are sexually, ............. . 
4 See n 1, 56. 
'Sec n 1, 58. 
10 
The Committee followed the Fraser Committee (in Canada) in enunciating principles 
which are common to all viewpoints and acknowledged that these may sometimes 
conflict. These principles are: Equality, individual responsibility, individual 
freedom, human dignity, and appreciation of sexuality (ie acknowledging the need 
for tolerance and openness in sexual matters). 
This paper shows how the Act accommodates all 3 viewpoints. 
B Purpose of the Act 
1 
The Act has a number of purposes which include: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Creating one test for all publications . 
Specifying what should be banned and what should be scrutinised . 
Addressing concerns of how women are portrayed in pornography . 
Enacting display provisions . 
One test 
Prior to the enactment of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 
1993 there were separate Acts that created separate structures and tests for 
censoring films, videos and other publications. The Act was enacted so as to have 
one structure and one test for all publications (as defined)6 whatever their medium. 
Apparantly, this one structure system is a world first.7 
6 See the Appendix for the definition of "Publication". 
Separate structures and tests arose because of the development of films and videos, separate from each 
other and separate from printed publications. 
7 NZPD, vol 532, 12757-12779, 2 December 1992, 12768. 
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The preamble to the Act states that it is an Act to consolidate and amend the law 
relating to the censoring of publications. It repeals previous legislation. Some 
aspects of the previous legal tests have been incorporated in the new test of 
"objectionable" and therefore many of the cases decided under the previous 
legislation will still be useful. Case law decided under the now repealed legislation 
comprises some High Court and Court of Appeal decisions, and all of the decisions 
of the Indecent Publications Tribunal. The Tribunal's function was to censor 
magazines and books and it published all of its decisions. As at September 1995 
there had been no cases on the new Act. 
11 
The overriding test is contained in section 3(1 ). A publication is "objectionable" if it 
deals with matters such as "sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner 
that the availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public good". 
Prima facie this test reflects liberal interests in that the test is saying that people can 
view whatever publications they like so long as those publications do not harm 
society. 
2 Specifying what should be banned and what scrutinised 
The Act was also an opportunity for the State to clearly define what kinds of 
material should be banned and what should be scrutinised.8 The Act does this 
through section 3 by banning publications which support or promote certain kinds of 
activity9 and by requiring publications which deal with certain kinds of activity to be 
given close scrutiny. 10 By restricting or banning the depictions described in the Act, 
11 
Censorship and Pornography Proposals for Legislation, Minister of Justice (October 1990), 10 where it 
was said: "Many people take strong issue with material which deals with the sexual exploitation of 
children or which portrays women in a very degrading manner." 
9 
Section 3(2) Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993. See the Appendix to this paper for 
the full text of section 3. 
111 
Section 3(3) Film, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993. 
12 
the State is seen to be upholding the principles endorsed by the Committee of 
Inquiry into Pornography and which are common to the three viewpoints of 
liberalism, conservatism, and feminism. The depictions reflect what the community 
perceives to be harmful. 
3 Concerns about how women are portrayed in pornography 
As well as creating one structure and one test, the Act was also an opportunity to 
address concerns as to how women are portrayed in pornography, ie to address 
what are commonly known as feminist concerns. There are standard themes in 
pornography which which have the effect of degrading women. These themes 
include: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Women always being sexually available . 
Women being sexually insatiable . 
Women enjoying abuse . 
Women being depicted as sexual objects . 
Women being humiliated or abused . 
Women's sole purpose being to sexually satisfy men . 
Women being presented in positions of sexual submission . 
Women being responsible for male sexual behaviour. 
These concerns are addressed by censors having to give weight to the extent and 
degree to which, and the manner in which a publication deals with conduct of a 
"degrading or dehumanising or demeaning nature", or "degrades or dehumanises or 
demeans any person"' 1 subject to the overriding test of availability of the publication 
being likely to be injurious to the public good. 
11 Section 3(3)(a)(iii) and (3)(c) Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993. 
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4 Display conditions 
In addition, the Act has new conditions on the display of restricted material. 12 
There were no display conditions under the previous legislation. 
Section 27 of the Act which contains display conditions relating to publications has 
an overriding test of the likelihood of offence to reasonable members of the public. 
This is in line with modern liberal thinking that the marketing of material such as 
pornographic material should not cause offence and appears to be one point where 
liberal and conservative thinking merges. 
13 
The test of offence to reasonable members of the public contrasts with the test of 
availability being injurious to the public good. Display conditions enable availability 
to be restricted in a practical way and so support the injury to the public good test. 
They enable publications classified as objectionable unless restricted to certain 
persons to be displayed in a manner that restricts them to those persons and they 
enable consumer advice to be noted on the publication. Display conditions are 
aimed at avoiding offence caused to reasonable members of the public by the 
marketing of certain publications 
C Act Covers More than Pornography 
When the Bill was being debated in Parliament, there was much emphasis on it being 
used to censor pornography. The Ministerial Committee of Inquiry had 
"pornography" in its title. However, the Act deals with more than matters of sex. It 
12 
It is likely that some decisions of the Office of Film and Literature Classification relating to the display 
of publications in sealed opaque packaging will be reviewed by the Film and Literature Board of Review. 
Before the Act, sealing was done voluntarily at the request of the Indecent Publications Tribunal and 
opaque packaging was not requested . 
14 
deals with "matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner 
as the availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public good." It 
does not include such matters and therefore the matters that can be dealt with are 
limited to matters related to the matters stated. Therefore the Act is not intended to 
suppress such matters as political, 13 religious or military expression. However, 
weight must be given to the extent and degree to which, and the manner in which 
the publication promotes or encourages criminal acts or acts of terrorism.
14 
D Government Publications Relating to the Act 
The Report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Pornography
15 
was 
followed by a paper released by the Minister of Justice, Censorship and 
Pornography Proposals for Legislation. 16 As part of the Select Committee 
process, the Justice Department prepared a report17 summarising the submissions 
made to the Select Committee. The Report of the Select Committee
18 
contains a 
summary of what the Bill did not cover. The Bill was introduced into the House on 
2 December 1992. 19 It came into force on 1 October 1994.
20 21 
13 "Films continued to be censored for political reasons well into the 1960's." P Christoffel Censored - a 
Short History of Censorship in New Zealand (Monograph Series No. 12, Research Unit, Department of 
Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1989) 18. 
14 See section 3(3)(e) Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993. 
15 See n l. 
16 See n 8. 
17 Report of the Department of Justice (DJ/3), 24 May 1993. 
18 Report of the Internal Affairs and Local Government Committee on the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Bill (1.7 A). 
19 NZPD, vol 532, 12757-12779, 2 December 1992. 
20
The Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act Commencement Order 1994 (1994/188). 
21 
The development of the Act by the Justice Department has been the subject of intensive consideration 
judging by the paper it has generated. Policy considerations prior lo the development of the Bill generated 
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E Freedom of Expression 
The Act restricts freedom of expression and so has human rights implications.22 
1 International obligations 
New Zealand has various international obligations and should take into account the 
the views of the bodies which monitor those obligations. In particular, New Zealand 
is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights23 (the 
Covenant). 
2 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the NZ Bill of Rights Act) was enacted 
to affirm New Zealand's commitment to the Covenant.24 Section 3 of the NZ Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 applies the NZ Bill of Rights Act to acts done by any body 
performing a public function imposed on that body by law.25 The NZ Bill of Rights 
Act (and relevant case law) therefore applies to the Office of Film and Literature 
Classification (established under the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification 
8 files. The development of the Bill generated 11 files. The Select Committee process generated 3 boxes 
of files (274 submissions). The Act is continuing to generate files within the Justice Department. 
22 
This is the likely reason for the Act being administered in the Justice Department and not the 
Department of Internal Affairs. 
23 
NZTS 1978, No. 19. In force in New Zealand 28 March 1979. 
24 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, preamble. 
25 
For example, see Re Penthouse (US) Vo! 19, No 5 and others [ 1990-92] 1 NZBORR 429 which held 
that the decisions of the Indecent Publications Tribunal were subject to the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 . 
16 
3 
Act 1993 to classify publications) and to the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
(established under the Broadcasting Act 1989). 
Canadian case law 
Article 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms26 has similar wording to 
section 5 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act, and the Canadian cases on the Charter on 
censorship are directly relevant in interpreting the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993 in relation to the NZ Bill of Rights Act. The leading 
relevant Canadian censorship case is the Supreme Court case of R v Butler.
27 
26 
Canada Act 1982 (Can), sch B, The Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985 Appendices, Appendix 11 , No 44 
(Queens Printer for Canada, Ottawa, 1985). 
27 (1992) 89 DLR (4th) 449. 
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IV THE BALANCE BETWEEN HARM AND OFFENCE 
A The Act is one Part of Censorship in New Zealand 
1 Marketplace censorship 
Self censorship imposed by providers of goods and services (as opposed to 
censorship by the State ) due to marketplace demand and which has an offence (ie a 
moral) basis is seen in many areas in New Zealand such as in libraries, education, 
bookshops, and newspapers (which are also concerned not to be exposed to 
litigation). This is a level of censorship below the overriding level of State 
censorship. 
2 State censorship of immoral conduct 
There is much legislation in New Zealand that limits immoral, indecent or obscene 
conduct (as opposed to harmful conduct). This includes: 
• Section 124 of the Crimes Act 1961 under which it is a crime to distribute 
indecent objects (which are not publications within the meaning of the Films, 
Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993) or to exhibit an indecent 
show. The Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 does not 
deal with live sex shows. It only deals with "publications" as defined in 
section 2 of the Act. 
• 
• 
Section 16 of the Trade Marks Act 1953 under which it is an offence to 
register a trade mark contrary to morality. 
Section 13 of the Postal Services Act 1987 under which it is an offence to 
post an indecent article. 
18 
• Section 8 of the Telecommunications Act 1987 under which it is an offence 
to use indecent or obscene language on the telephone with the intention of 
offending the recipient. 
• Section 8A of the same Act under which it is an offence for commercial 
operators of telephone lines to use indecent or obscene language. 0900 
providers must agree to abide by Telecom's Code of Conduct which includes 
respecting moral and ethical standards in the form and content of their 
services.28 The Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 does 
not deal with telephone services such as sex telephone lines, videophones, or 
computer bulletin boards (unless a copy is in tangible form such as on 
magnetic disk). 
• Section 4 of the Broadcasting Act 1989 under which broadcasters must 
comply with standards of good taste and decency. The Films, Videos, and 
Publications Classification Act 1993 does not deal with broadcasting except 
in the limited way discussed later in this paper. 
• 
• 
Section 4 of the Summary Offences Act 1981 under which it is an offence to 
use indecent or obscene words to any person in a public place. (Section 4 
does not apply to publications within the meaning of the Films, Videos, and 
Publications Classification Act 1993.) 
Section 62 of the Human Rights Act 1993 which makes it unlawful to 
subject a person in, for example, the work place, to offensive behaviour by 
the use of visual material of a sexual nature and which has a detrimental 
effect on that person. 
This legislation does not appear to be perceived as censorship by the community 
possibly because some of it focuses on conduct and public order (sometimes 
2
R As referred to in Briefing Paper to the Chairman Internal Affairs and Local Government Select 
Commillee 011 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Bill (MOC/1, Ministry of Commerce, 24 
May 1993), 7. In 1995 Telecom NZ Ltd ended its 0900 telephone sex lines. However, similar lines can 
be accessed directly from overseas. 
3 
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19 
associated with a particular item on which a finding of fact on such matters as 
indecency has to be made) that offends against decency and in doing so requires a 
court to assess whether conduct breaches legislation having regard to contemporary 
standards of propriety in the community and to the particular circumstances in which 
the conduct takes place.
29 Its focus is on conduct and not on restricting the 
availability of an item although this can be a necessary consequence. In this respect 
it differs from the focus of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 
1993 which is on the status of the publication itself and its availability with offences 
being committed from conduct associated with that publication. The focus of the 
Act is not one of having regard to conduct associated with a publication and having 
regard to particular circumstances but is on the publication itself, having regard to 
(as will be elaborated shortly) what the community thinks. 
Bodies related to the censorship function 
· In addition to the Office of Film and Literature Classification these are: 
• The Labelling Body is approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs under 
section 72 of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993. It 
functions to rate films and videos, ie to provide consumer information as to 
audience suitability for films and videos that are unlikely to be restricted. If a 
film or video is likely to be restricted to persons over the age of 16, the 
Labelling Body forwards it to the Office of Film and Literature Classification 
29 
For example, see Jeffrey v Police 4.5.94, Tipping J, HC Christchurch AP 53/94. This was a decision on 
section 4(2) Summary Offences Act 1981. It is not necessary to prove someone was actively offended, 
only that persons hearing the words spoken are likely to be offended. It is an objective test in that 
intention to offend is irrelevant. See also the Court of Appeal decision of Police v Newsmedia Ownership 
Ltd l 1975] l NZLR 610, 625 where the test was whether there was a "sufficient affront to the ordinary 
common standards of propriety in the community" on the basis that a newspaper was the equivalent of 
words spoken in a public place. This decision was overruled by the Court of Appeal case of Collector of 
Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd [1986] 1 NZLR 404 which confirmed that the test under the 
Indecent Publications Act 1963 was "injurious to the public good". 
20 
for classification30 • In practice, the Labelling Body is guided by overseas 
classifications. 
Only films and videos are precensored. Other publications are not although 
it would be logical to apply the principle of consumer information and 
precensorship to all publications. The rationale for films and videos only is 
that it is obviously too difficult to examine all publications. Furthermore, 
once a person is exposed to a film its images do have an impact on them 
regardless of their ability to fully comprehend it. Viewers are a captive 
audience. 
• The Advertising Standards Authority regulates advertisements including 
broadcast advertisements. It is a voluntary industry funded body. It has 
developed a Code of Practice for Advertising. The Office of Film and 
Literature can also scrutinise advertisements so long as they are in tangible 
form. 
• 
• 
Broadcasting Standards Authority hears complaints about broadcast 
material ( except advertisements) that contravenes the standard of good taste 
and decency. It has developed Codes of Broadcasting Practice which 
contain Approved Codes drawn up by broadcasters. 
The Customs Department seizes objectionable publications under section 48 
of the Customs Act 1966. 
The Act is therefore one part of censorship in New Zealand. However, much of that 
censorship focuses on offence and good taste. The Act focuses on harm. 
Censorship in New Zealand is a mix of self regulation, and government intervention. 
30 The video industry commenced the labelling of videos in the early 1980's to improve the image of the 
industry. Then, videos were either dealt with under the Indecent Publications Act 1963 or by the film 
censor if it was claimed that the video was to be exhibited publicly. The film censor was perceived to be 
more liberal. See n 13, 38. 
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B The Symbolism of State Censorship and the Test of Harm 
Although there is much censorship in the marketplace, in legislation dealing with 
conduct, and by other bodies, State censorship is symbolic of everything that 
democracy does not represent. For this reason it has a high public profile and is 
cautiously applied. However, censorship exists because the community perceives 
certain material to be harmful to the community. This cautious application is 
reflected in the Act appearing to go further than a conservative view of morality 
based on distaste and offensiveness and is stated to be based on a more liberal view 
of harm (with its assumption that people will tolerate what they perceive not to be 
harmful). The wording of section 3 of the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993 reflects the awareness of the concept of harm in that it uses 
the word "injurious". It also uses "objectionable" instead of "indecent" to reflect the 
description of material which will be banned outright.31 "Indecent" had 
connotations of morality even though the test that defined it in the repealed 
legislation32 used "injurious" and therefore embodied the concept of harm. The 
symbolism of censorship is also reflected in the title of the Act which does not refer 
to censorship but to "classification". This emphasises that the Act focuses not on 
banning publications outright (ie not on censorship), but on classifying them, not 
necessarily so that all of the public cannot access them ( classified as objectionable) 
but where appropriate so that some members of the public cannot access them 
( classified as restricted) or that all members of the public can access them ( classified 
as unrestricted). 
The determination of status in the Act divorced from conduct in particular 
circumstances, and expressions in a tangible form being more enduring than spoken 
31 Seen 8, 11. 
32 
Section 2 Indecent Publications Act 1963, and section 2 Video Recordings Act 1987. 
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expressions, are possible factors in the symbolism attached to censorship of tangible 
expressions and why the liberal view appears to prevail in the overriding test. 
It could be said that the essence of the symbolism of censorship is contained in the 
freedom of the press. In a minor way the Act protects the freedom of the press. It 
does this by excluding newspapers from being the subject of serial publication 
orders.33 
C Section 3: Harm 
1 Section 3 in relation to the Act as a whole 
Section 3 is the heart of the Act. It is the basis on which classification decisions are 
made. It contains the criteria which the Classification Office must have regard to in 
classifying publications. Having examined a "publication" as defined
34 
according to 
the statutory criteria in section 3, the Classification Office can, under section 23 of 
the Act using the harm test, classify it as objectionable, restricted or unrestricted. It 
can then impose display conditions using the offence to reasonable members of the 
public test. The Act also contains penalty provisions relating to conduct associated 
with publications which have a certain status. 
2 The structure of section 3 
In classifying a publication the censor must first establish whether there is 
jurisdiction to classify the publication under section 3(1) by asking whether the 
publication deals with matters such as sex, horror etc. 
33 See section 2 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 which excludes newspapers from 
the definition of "serial publication". 
34 Sec the Appendix to this paper. 
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Subsection 2 deems certain kinds of activity objectionable, and subsection 3 requires 
other kinds of activity to be given particular weight according to their extent, 
manner and degree in the publication along with other relevant factors listed in 
subsection 4. The presence of subsection 3 items increases the likelihood of a 
publication being injurious to the public good but is not conclusive. 
Interpreting section 3 - the meaning of injurious 
A key issue that will arise in interpreting section 3 will be (as it was under the 
repealed legislation) the meaning of "injurious" (including the distinction between 
offence and harm, proof of harm, the requirement for standards, the nature of those 
standards, establishing standards, and what treatments amount to being harmful). 
(a) The distinction between harm and offence 
The test "availability ..... is likely to be injurious to the public good" is rigorous. As 
stated, it contrasts with the lesser offence test in the display provisions of section 27 
of the Act, a test which is used in Australia35 and in the United States. In the United 
States Supreme Court case of Miller it was said:36 
A state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the 
prurient37 interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and 
which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
However, the Morris Report38 said that the Supreme Court's statement in Miller 
has been described as covering only the really hard core pornographic material so it 
is likely that the offence test is not the same test as is understood in New Zealand, ie 
35 Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Clh), section 11 and sch (National 
Classification Code). 
36 Miller v State of California 413 US 15; 37 L Ed 2d 419. 
37 Meaning includes: Uneasily or morbidly interested, curious or craving: dallying with lascivious 
thoughts. Chambers Twentieth Centwy Dictiona,y (New edition, T & A Constable Ltd, Edinburgh, 
Reprinted 1974). 
38 See n 1,151. 
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as a wider standard than injurious. This indicates that the test cannot always be 
assessed from the words. 
The test is not an affront to commonly accepted standards.39 
Last century, the test of obscenity was the Hicklin test of whether material depraved 
· h . I . fl " 40 and corrupted "those whose minds are open to sue 1mmora m uences ....... . 
The focus was therefore on the corruption of morals, and on the corruption of the 
most weak minded persons. The test was used in early censorship legislation in 
New Zealand under the Offensive Publications Act 1892 to ban publications which 
were "obscene", "immoral" or "indecent" (including publications which referred to 
sexual disease). The Indecent Publications Act 1910 was enacted and had the same 
test as the 1892 Act with the addition that it protected publications which had merit. 
Because the Act was conservatively interpreted, the Hicklin test was used until 1939 
when literary merit was actually taken into account.41 The Cinematograph Films 
Act of 191642 had the test of "public order", "decency" and "undesirable in the 
public interest" and was enacted due to the concern about the effects of films on 
young people. In 1954 the Indecent Publications Act 1910 was amended so that 
"indecency" included "undue emphasis on matters of sex, horror, crime, cruelty or 
violence" due to the concern over the relationship of comics with juvenile crime.43 
39 
Society for Promotion of Community Standards v Everard [1987] 7 NZAR 33, 56. (A High Court 
decision). 
40 
R. v Hicklin (1868) LR 3QB 360,371 as referred to in R. v Butler 89 DLR (4th) 449,463. 
41 
Seen 13, 9-10 for an outline of the history of censorship in New Zealand.Censored A short history of 
censorship in New Zealand 
42 
Seen 13. The Cinematograph Films Act 1961 was later enacted to consolidate regulations. 
43 
See n 13. The Court of Appeal banned the book Lolita on the basis of this legislation despite the book 
having merit. 
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"Corrupted" was also used in the now repealed Indecent Publications Act 1963 
although it was not the overriding test.44 
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The Hicklin test was also used in the United States until 193445 and in England until 
1959.46 It was also used in Canada until replaced by a legislated definition of 
obscenity .
47 
This legislated definition could be said to affirm the morality test, ie 
society's sense of what is right and wrong, but it has been interpreted 48 as 
recognising harm that can be done to society by such treatments. This interpretation 
shows the shift from morality to harm, from conservatism to liberalism. 
Drawing a distinction between harm and morality can be difficult. What is now seen 
as~ m rality could have been justified in years past as causing harm to society. Is 
ta change of words to justify restrictions on freedom of expression in today's 
civil liberties climate and to disassociate the reasons for restrictions today from the 
reasons of years past? As Sopinka J in Butler said: 49 
The prevention of "dirt for dirt ' s sake" is not a legitimate objective which would justify the 
violation of one of the most fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Charter. 
However, he linked morality to harm when he said:50 
44 
Section ll(l)(e) Indecent Publications Act 1963. 
45 
See LH Tribe American Constitlllional law (2nd ed, The Foundation Press Inc. , New York, 1988), 907-
908. The test was rejected when a US court held that the book Ulysses was not obscene and "suggested 
instead a standard based on the effect on the average reader of the dominant theme of the work as a 
whole". Later in the case of Roth v United States 354 US 476 (1957) the test shifted from immoral 
influence to prurient appeal 
46 
J Green The Encyc/opedia of Censorship (Facts on File, New York, 1990) 12. 
47 
Section 163(8) Criminal Code 1985: "For the purposes of this Act, any publication a dominant 
characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or more of the following 
subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be obscene." This section first 
came into force in 1959. For material to be obscene under this section it must deal with sex. 
48 
Seen 27. 
49 
Seen 27, 476. 
50 
Seen 27, 477. 
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..... ... notions of moral corruption and harm to society arc not distinct ........... but are 
inextricably linked. It is moral corruption of a certain kind which leads to the detrimental 
effect on society . 
His view is that pornography can harm society due to the attitudinal changes (such 
as increased callousness towards women) that occur in viewers of such material. 
The requirement in the New Zealand classsification scheme to distinguish between 
offence and the avoidance of harm is present not only in the display conditions in the 
Act51 but also in broadcasting52 where the standard required of broadcasters is one 
of good taste and decency. Such standards are broader than harm and impose more 
censorship. They reflect the conservative view, the standard of behaviour that 
reasonable members of the community would adopt in the particular situation. 
Harm is an objective test, but then so is offence. What can be said about harm is 
that it should result in less censorship than offence. 
It is unlikely that the test of harm will be changed. It has existed in New Zealand 
law since 1963 in the Indecent Publications Act 1963, in the Cinematograph Films 
Act 1976 (replaced by the Films Act 1983 but which retained the test of "likely to be 
injurious to the public good"), and in the Video Recordings Act 1987, and is 
supported by Canadian jurisprudence as in the case of Butler. It is in keeping with 
the concept that in a democracy the focus should be on freedom of expression. The 
Indecent Publications Act 1963 was enacted to deflect the focus from content and to 
create the broader test of harm so that meritous works such as Lolita would no 
longer be banned. Harm avoids the need to define pornography. 
From the brief history outlined, the following can be identified as factors causing 
change to censorship legislation: 
5 1 Section 27(2) Film, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993. 
52 Section 4(1)(a) Broadcasting Act 1989. 
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The changes in new technology ie films (the Cinematograph Films Act 1916 
and subsequent film legislation), magazines and comics (the amendment to 
the Indecent Publications Act 1910), and videos (the Video Recordings Act 
1987). 
The need for the rationalisation of legislation from a machinery point of 
view. 
The perceptions of the community as to the effects of technology and what it 
depicts, on persons exposed to that material (the 1954 amendment to the 
Indecent Publications Act 1910). 
Social changes such as the sexual revolution of the 1960's, the changing role 
of women, and the availability of harder pornography, (the Indecent 
Publications Act 1963), and the liberal, moral, and feminist responses to 
those changes (ie a shift in focus from content to effect). 
All of these factors have been relevant to the enactment of the Act. The final factor of 
social change is reflected in the feminist view which which is incorporated in the Act for 
the first time although previous legislation used the word "denigrate". 
(b) Standards required in lieu of proof of harm 
(i) Proof of harm: Comptroller of Customs v Gordon and Gotch (NZ) Ltd53 provides 
the reasons for the Court 's finding that there does not need to be concrete evidence 
of injury to the public good. It is the task of the expert body, then the Indecent 
Publications Tribunal, the Film Censor, and the Video Recordings Authority (and 
now the Office of Film and Literature Classification), to exercise judgment about the 
likelihood of injury to the public good. Jefferies J based his conclusion of actual 
proof not being required to determine injury to the public good on the Indecent 
Publications Tribunal being an expert body and being able to draw on its own 
experience to reach a decision, and also on a doctrine adopted by the United States 
53 
[ 1987] 2 NZLR 80. 
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Supreme Court which made a distinction between adjudicative facts (facts which 
concern only the parties to a case) and legislative facts (facts which form the basis 
for the creation of law and policy). He said
54 that the Indecent Publications 
Tribunal (now replaced by the Office of Film and Literature Classification) in 
determining injury to the public good is not deciding on facts but is making a 
judgment, and is taking the place of judge and jury. Section 4 of the Act codifies 
that decision and also says that if evidence is available then it is to be considered. In 
doing so, it eliminates the debate of whether such depictions are a symptom of harm 
or cause harm. 
Support for this view is that there does not need to be concrete proof is found in the 
Canadian Supreme Court. (When referring to obscene material which is degrading 
or dehumanising) Sopinka J said:55 
This type of material would, apparantly, fail the community standards test not because it 
offends against morals but because it is perceived by public opinion to be harmful to society, 
particularly to women. While the accuracy of this perception is not susceptible of exact 
proof, there is a substantial body of opinion that holds that the portrayal of persons being 
subjected to degrading or dehumanizing sexual treatment results in harm, particularly to 
women and therefore to society as a whole. 
Further, quoting from Towne Cinema:56 
The most that can be said, I think, is that the public has concluded that exposure to material 
which degrades the human dimensions of life to a subhuman or merely physical dimension 
and thereby contributes to a process of moral desensitization must be harmful in some way. 
Not requiring proof of a causal relationship between certain depictions and harm to 
society is a fundamental shift from the liberal view of actual proof being required 
54 See n 53, 92. 
55 Sec n 27, 467. 
56 R v Towne Cinema Theatres (Ltd) 18 DLR (4th) 1. 
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and accommodates feminist concerns that the harm done to society is the attitudes it 
causes to women. It provides a rationale for more censorship, rather than less 
censorship. It also provides a basis for saying that the Act by reducing availability is 
not attempting to deal with what causes such material but with its effect on the 
community. 
(ii) Requirement for standards in section 3: Jefferies Jin Gordon v Gotch did not 
discuss using standards to gauge injury to the public good although he did say57 that 
it is generally accepted that explicit displays of sexual intercourse are injurious to 
the public good. He said that proof was not required because the decision on 
indecency was a judgment made by an expert body drawing on its experience (and 
that would be evidence in itself in any other forum), and any other available 
evidence, and that the usual forms of proof may be inappropriate. The decision does 
not address the issue of how the expert body is to form that judgment. 
Although there is no expressly worded test of a standard such as "offence to 
reasonable members of the public" in section 27, it is necessary, because of lack of 
proof, to take into account public perceptions of what is injurious to the public 
good. The Canadian jurisprudence accepts that harm cannot be proved and so relies 
on community standards to gauge harm. That standard is the standard defined by 
the community as a whole.5R 
Because this is not a matter that is susceptible to proof in the traditional way and because we 
do not wish to leave it to the individual tastes of judges, we must have a norm that will serve 
as an arbiter in determining what amounts to the undue exploitation of sex. That arbiter is 
the community as a whole. 
This is a fundamental and clearly stated insight on the part of the Canadian 
jurisprudence as to the interrelationship between harm, standards and proof and is 
57 See n 53, 98. 
58 Seen 27, 470. 
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relevant to understanding the New Zealand Act. It has implications not just for 
pornography but for other material covered by the Act where the research as to the 
causal relationship between exposure to material and harm is contradictory. 
Although section 3 indicates those matters which are likely to be injurious to the 
public good and those which must be given the closest scrutiny, in applying them to 
the millions of depictions that the Office of Film and Literature Classification 
examines, the Office must, within the guidelines of the Act, judge what the 
community is prepared to tolerate.59 
The Office is not imposing censorship but is assessing what censorship the 
community wants. Its decisions must reflect tolerance rather than imposing a level 
of tolerance. The two tier approach reflects what society at present is not prepared 
to tolerate and this may change in the future. Consistent with the reflection of 
tolerance is the ability of members of the community under section 13 of the Act to 
submit material for classification that they find intolerable and for the Office to 
assess that intolerance against the tolerance of the community at large. This is one 
mechanism in the Act for the Office of Film and Literature to maintain awareness of 
community tolerance. 
The requirement for standards in lieu of proof accommodates feminist concerns, and 
also reflects an aspect of the conservative view (which requires standards to gauge 
morality). 
(c) Nature of community standards 
In applying community standards of tolerance to gauge harm, it is necessary to 
understand the nature of those standards. Community standards are those of 
59 
See Censorship Procedure (Law Reform Commission Report No. 55, Commonwealth of Australia, 
1991) 3: "The objective of Australian censorship law is to regulate the availability of films and 
publications within the broad framework of general community standards". 
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tolerance of harm and not taste, they are contemporary, and they are those of the 
average New Zealander who cares about the possibility of harm. New Zealand 
courts in dealing with censorship have not addressed themselves to any great degree 
to the nature of standards. 
Tolerance not taste: The Canadian Supreme Court has confirmed that the standard 
is an objective one of tolerance and not taste.60 
What matters is not what Canadians think is right for themselves to see. What matters is 
what Canadians would not abide other Canadians seeing because it would be beyond the 
contemporary standard of tolerance to allow them to see it. 
It also confirmed that the Canadian community would tolerate varying degrees of 
explicitness depending on the audience and circumstances.61 This is embodied in the 
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 in the ability to restrict 
publications, and accords with the liberal viewpoint of protecting children, and the 
marketing of material not causing offence. 
(ii) Relationship between tolerance and harm: Sopinka J said:62 
The courts must determine as best they can what the community would tolerate others being 
exposed to on the basis of the degree of harm that may flow from such exposure . Harm in 
this context means that it predisposes persons to act in an antisocial manner as, for example, 
the physical or mental mistreatment of women by men, or, what is perhaps debatable, the 
reverse. Antisocial conduct for this purpose is conduct which society formally recognizes as 
incompatible with its proper functioning. The stronger the inference of a risk of harm the 
lesser the likelihood of tolerance. The inference may be drawn from the material itself or 
from the material and other evidence. Similarly evidence as to the community standards is 
desirable but not essential. 
611 See n 27, 465 . 
61 Seen 27,465 quoting from the 1985 Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Towne Cinema Theatres Ltd 
18 DLR (4th) 1. 
62 S cc n 27, 470-471. 
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In other words Sopinka J uses the community standard of tolerance to gauge the 
risk of harm. Gonthier J elaborated:63 
It must mean tolerance not only of the materials, but also tolerance of the harm which they 
may bring about. It is a more complicated and more reflective form of tolerance than what 
was considered by Dickson C.J.C. in Towne Cinema. 
In view of the criteria that Classification Office must have regard to under the New 
Zealand legislation it can be said that the harms and what the community finds 
intolerable are already specified to a large degree and that it is in unclear cases or in 
cases that don't readily fit the specified criteria that the Classification Office must 
consider the question of tolerance. 
(iii) Contemporary standards: In Miller it was said that the test is whether the average 
person applying contemporary community standards would find that the work taken 
as a whole appeals to the prurient interest.64 The test is therefore one of 
contemporary community standards. This statement acknowledges that standards 
are not fixed and change with time. As the Canadian Supreme Court said of the 
Canadian Criminal Code:65 "Community standards as to what is harmful have 
changed since 1959." A difficulty is monitoring these changing standards. This is 
followed through in the Act which provides for a research unit66 the function of 
which is to ascertain current research and there is provision to consult with 
interested groups.67 
63 See n 27, 496. 
64 Seen 36, 431. 
65 Seen 27, 478. 
66 Section 88 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993. 
67 
Section 21 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993. 
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The monitoring of standards was illustrated in the decision of Re Penthouse (US) 
Vol 19, No 568 where the Indecent Publications Tribunal changed its guidelines after 
having heard evidence that sexual depictions intended for sexual arousal were not of 
themselves harmful. 
In Gordon v Gotch69 it was said that there should be no rigid adherence to 
guidelines. 
What is now accepted is explicit sex between adults of itself whereas before Re 
Penthouse it would have been banned by the conservative viewpoint. Pornography 
is not defined in the Act nor is it defined in other jurisdictions relevant to New 
Zealand. Explicit sex for the purpose of sexual arousal that is not objectionable 
under section 3 is likely to be restricted. Group sex, and homosexual sex are no 
longer banned. In Butler70 it was said that explicit sex that is not violent and neither 
degrading nor dehumanising nor uses children in its production is generally tolerated 
in Canadian society but its availability is restricted. Butler supports the approach in 
Re Penthouse. 
(iv) Average person: Miller used the test of the average person. It has been said of 
standards in Canada, after a review of cases earlier than the Supreme Court case of 
Butler, that standards are not set by those of lower taste nor by those of puritan 
taste but somewhere in between.71 Gonthier J supported this in Butler when he 
said: 72 
68 Seen 25. 
69 
See n 53. 
711 Seen 27, 471. 
71 K. Mahoney "Canaries in a Coal Mine: Canadian Judges and the Reconstruction of Obscenity Law" in 
the Schneiderman (ed) Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Carswell)) 145, 149-150. 
ns cc n 27,495. 
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Tolerance would be some form of enlightened, altruistic taste, which would factor in and 
sum up the tastes of the whole population. 
He elaborated on this when he said 73 that when different segments of a pluralistic 
society agree on what is not good then the state can intervene in the name of 
morality. New Zealand case law accords with the view that it is the finding of the 
ordinary person who is neither hypersensitive or insensitive.
74 
(v) Community that cares: The average person has been extended to be the average 
person who cares and not an average of persons which includes persons who don't 
care.75 
(vi) Community defined geographically: In Miller it was also said that the community 
was that of the State of California76 which is logical considering it was a California 
statute under consideration and the jury was drawn from the local community. New 
Zealand has a fairly homogenous culture, is small geographically and has a mobile 
population, and the Act is a public Act. For these reasons, in New Zealand, the 
community is that of the whole country. The Canadian Supreme Court confirmed 
that in Canada it is the standards of the community as a whole and not the standards 
of a small section of the community.77 
( d) Establishing standards 
This is extremely difficult. One judge has asked: How does one have one's finger 
"on the pornographic pulse of the nation?"78 Under the Act it is a matter for the 
73 See 11 27, 498. 
74 For example see the High Court decision of Zdrahal v Wellington City Council [1995] 1 NZLR 700, 
707. (Whether a swastika painted on a house was offensive under the Resource Management Act 1991). 
75 See n 71,150. 
76 See n 36,435. 
77 Seen 27, 465. 
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judgment of the Office of Film and Literature Classification having regard to its 
expertise and to relevant research and consulting with interested parties. The 
recourse to the Film and Literature Board of Review to review a classification 
decision de nova is a safety net. 79 There is no escaping the fact that the Office of 
Film and Literature Classification is not only the judge, but is also the jury of 
average persons in the community. In being the judge it must assess what the view 
is of the average person in the community, but in being the jury the standards of the 
individual censors impact on the decision. This applies also to the Film and 
Literature Board of Review. 
In Canada it has been said80 that market availability is used as an indicator of 
community acceptance and that this is not a good indicator because mostly men 
purchase pornography and that this leads to a male defined standard of tolerance. In 
New Zealand market availability is not used as an indicator of community standards 
(at least not directly). Persons who find the availability of material unacceptable can 
submit it to the Office of Film and Literature Classification for classification.81 
In the end "It is a judgment on questions of a speculative nature."82 
A community standards index based on demographic and attitudinal variables could 
be used to assess community tolerance of say pornography in general but this would 
not assist in reaching a judgment on the degrees of pornography. 
79 
It is unlikely that there will be many cases appealed from the Film and Literature Board of Review. 
This prediction is based on the fact that there have been very High Court and Court of Appeal cases under 
the repealed legislation. 
xus ee n 71, 150. 
8 1 
Section 13 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993. 
82 S ee n 71 , 150. 
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(e) What amounts to injurious 
(i) Wording of section 3: The broad meaning of injurious is indicated by the words 
"such as sex, horror ...... " in section 3(1 ). 
• Section 3(1) - availability: "Availability" was not used in the repealed 
legislation. It means that in appropriate cases (but not in section 3(2) cases) 
availability can be restricted to certain persons, for example, to persons over 
the age of 18 and it is only when made available to persons not in the 
designated class that the publication is harmful. (A common example is 
sexually explicit material intended for sexual arousal which does not come 
within the criteria of section 3. Such material, as previously stated is 
tolerated by the community but only if it is made available to adults). If 
section 3(2) applies then the availability of a publication to anyone is deemed 
to be harmful. 
• Section 3(1) - likely: This was not present in the repealed legislation except 
in the Films Act 1983. The Office of Film and Literature Classification must 
also consider what the likelihood of harm is and whether it is a real 
likelihood and not a paranoid possibility .83 It could be said that "likelihood" 
is used to indicate that actual proof of the harm is not required. 
The wording of section 3(2),(3) and (4) gives an indication of what "injurious" is 
likely to mean. These words provide more guidance to classification officers than the 
repealed legislation.84 However, in practice, it can be difficult to distinguish 
between section 3(2) and (3). 
R
3 Seen 39, 57. 
R4 Indecent Publications Act 1963, section 2: " 'Indecent' includes describing, depicting, expressing, or 
otherwise dealing with matters of sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in a manner that is injurious to 
the public good." 
Section 11 : "(l) In classifying or determining the character of any book or sound recording the Tribunal 
shall take into consideration-
(a) The dominant effect of the book or sound recording as a whole: 
(b) The literary or artistic merit, or the medical, legal, political, social, or scientific character or 
importance of the book or sound recording: 
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(ii) Morality disguised as harm: Certainly the items in section 3(2) must be accepted 
as being "injurious" because they are deemed to be so. Many of them seem to have 
originated from the first guideline as expressed in Re Penthouse. 85 However, do all 
section 3(2) items truly reflect what society would not tolerate others being exposed 
to based on the harm to society that might follow? For example, section 3(2)(d) is 
curious. A publication is deemed objectionable (ie is banned outright) if it promotes 
or supports or tends to promote or support "The use of urine or excrement in 
(c) The persons, classes of persons, or age groups to or amongst whom the book or sound recording is or is 
intended or is likely to be published, heard, distributed, sold, exhibited, played, given, sent, or delivered: 
(d) The price at which the book or sound recording sells or is intended to be sold: 
(e) Whether any per~on is likely to be corrupted by reading the book or hearing the sound recording and 
whether other persons are likely to benefit therefrom: 
(f) Whether the book or the sound recording displays an honest purpose and an honest thread of thought 
or whether its content is merely camouflage designed to render acceptable any indecent parts of the book 
or sound recording." 
Video Recordings Act 1987, section 2 defined "Indecent" the same as the the Indecent Publications Act 
1963. 
Section 21 (2): 
"In determining the classification of any video recording, the Authority shall consider the following 
matters: 
(a) The dominant effect of the video recording as a whole: 
(b) The extent to which the video recording has merit, value, or importance in relation to artistic, social, 
cultural, or other matters: 
(c) The persons, classes of persons, or the age groups of the persons, by whom the video recording is most 
likely to be viewed: 
(d) The extent and degree to which and the manner in which the video recording depicts, includes, or 
treats anti-social behaviour or offensive language or behaviour: 
(e) The extent and degree to which and the mannner in which the video recording denigrates any 
particular class of the general public by reference to the colour, race, ethnic or national origins, sex, or 
religious beliefs of the members of that class: 
(f) The particular purpose for which the video recording is intended to be used." 
Films Act 1983, section 13(1 )(b ), the Chief Censor shall: 
" .. ... .. examine the film to determine whether the exhibition of the film is or is not likely to be injurious to 
the public good." 
The matters that the Chief Censor had regard to were similar to those in the Video Recordings Act 1987 
except between the words "anti-social behaviour" and "or offensive language" in ( d) were the additional 
words: "cruelty, violence, crime, horror, sex, or indecent". There was no equivalent of (c) or (f). 
85 
Seen 25, 472. 
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association with degrading or dehumanising conduct or sexual cond
uct" whereas 
sexual or physical conduct of a degrading or dehumanising or deme
aning nature is 
said in section 3(3) to be something that must be given weight to, ie
 it is not banned 
outright. While it could be said that the addition of urine or excrem
ent to such 
conduct adds an element of distaste, it is questionable whether it ad
ds an element of 
/ Jharm. It could be said that this is an example of morality disguised a
s harm. 
Could section 3(2) be used to ban Lolita? Section 3(4)(c), which all
ows merit to be 
taken into account, is not a defence nor does it seem to apply to sec
tion 3(2). In 
order for Lolita not to be banned it would seem that the overall test 
of likely to be 
injurious to the public good would have to be used, despite the fact
 the section 3(2) 
deems certain publications to be objectionable. 
(iii) Section 3(2) - promotes or supports has liberal elements: At 
first glance it appears 
that under section 3(2) a publication can be banned on the basis of c
ontent alone, 
whereas under section 3(3) it can be banned or restricted on the bas
is of 
representation (extent, manner and degree) and content. However,
 the words 
promotes or supports or tends to promote or support contain a repre
sentational 
element. It was intended that something more than a mere portrayal was
 necessary 
so that serious treatments of the subject were not rendered objectio
nable.
86 It is the 
manner in which and the extent and degree to which content is repr
esented that 
makes it injurious to the public good. In considering section 3(2) it
 is difficult to 
depart from the words of section 3(2), "extent" "manner" and "deg
ree" although 
these words are not used in section 3(2). Using the urolagnia exam
ple it could be 
said that it would be exceeding the Act to ban a publication on this 
basis if the 
advertisement together with other advertisements of a similar nature
 is a small part 
of the publication, is individually short and the publication does not
 go further and 
actively support the practice. Against this it could be said that by a
llowing the 
86 See n 1 7, 8. 
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advertisement to be placed in the publication, the publication is tending to promote 
or support urolagnia. In applying the Act it would appear that the conservatism of 
section 3(2) is not as clear cut as it first appears and that the elements described in 
section 3(2) are allowed to some extent, so long as they are not injurious to the 
public good. 
39 
(iv) Feminist concerns of discrimination are in the harm test: Section 3(3)(a)(iii) of 
the Act uses the words "degrading", "dehumanising" and "demeaning". These 
words are intended to address feminist concerns about the portrayal of (usually) 
women in pornography althought the wording is gender neutral ( children in 
pornography are more specifically dealt with under section 3(2)(d)). They catch the 
harm done to women87 and therefore to society by depictions which subordinate 
women and lead to a negative image of women.88 89 Section 3(3)( e) catches 
material which represents that members of a particular class of the public are 
inherently inferior by reason of a characteristic that is a prohibited ground of 
discrimination under the Human Rights Act 199390 but section 3(3)(a)(iii) goes 
further. 
87 Human Rights in New Zealand: Report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Information 
Bulletin No. 54, June 1995, Wellington, New Zealand) 8. It said that the Act "which seeks to curb the 
availability of pornographic material harmful to the public good, is aimed in part at preventing the 
demeaning of women". The United Nations Human Rights Committee monitors countries ' compliance 
with the Covenant. 
88 For statements against discrimination see: 
• Article l Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
• Articles 3 and 26 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. 
• Articles 5 and 6 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
• Section 19 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
• Sections 15(1) and 28 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
x
9 Similar concerns have been expressed in Australia. Seen 35 Classification Code, "(d) the need to take 
account of community concerns about ............... (ii) the portrayal of persons in a demeaning manner". 
This provision is new. 
911 Section 21 Human Rights Act 1993: Prohibited grounds of discrimination arc: Sex, marital status, 
religious belief, ethical belief, colour, race, ethnic or national origins, disability, age, political opinion, 
employment status, family status, and sexual orientation. 
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The Canadian Supreme Court said:
91 
There has been a growing recognition in recent cases that material which may be said to 
exploit sex in a 'degrading or dehumanizing' manner will necessarily fail the community 
standards test .. ........ .. ... they run against the principles of equality and dignity of all human 
beings. 
Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin in 1983 defined pornography in terms of 
sexually explicit material which subordinates women so that women who had been 
discriminated against by it could have a civil remedy. Actions which would give rise 
to a civil remedy would be forcing pornography on a person, assault of a person 
linked to pornography, and coercion of a person in producing pornography. This 
was aimed at the effects of pornography on specific persons.
92 The definition of 
pornography was accepted by the Committee of Inquiry into Pornography but not so 
that it be used as a basis for classification?' Although pornography is not defined in 
the Act, much of what is contained in the definition is expressed in section 3 along 
with non sexual material. The changing role of women which gave rise to feminist 
thinking regarding pornography, thinking which is encapsulated in the definition and 
is supported by women's lobby groups, has likely been a factor in developing the 
perception of the harm of pornography without proof. "Demeans" was added in the 
second version of the Bill to give effect to feminist concerns and encapsulates the 
concept of lowering dignity. In Gordon v Gotch the Court found that certain 
depictions of women did not symbolise all women and therefore did not "denigrate" 
(ie lower the reputation of) all women.94 
91 Seen 27, 466. 
92 See section 62 Human Rights Act 1993 (referred to earlier) for the New Zealand solution. 
93 See n 1, 28. 
94 Seen 53. This view was approved in Community for Promotion of Community Standards v Everard. 
Seen 39. 
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Effect of consent: The Canadian Supreme Court also said95 : 
Consent cannot save materials that otherwise contain degrading or dehumanizing scenes. 
Sometimes the very appearance of consent makes the depicted acts even more degrading or 
dehumanizing. 
This seems to support the view that the words "degrading", "dehumanising", and 
"demeaning" will be interpreted by the courts to accommodate feminist concerns. 
Section 3(4)(a) - dominant effect: While section 3(2) and (3) deal specifically with 
harm, section 3( 4) deals with broader matters that could be harmful relating to the 
overall effect of a publication, its impact, its value, its readership, its purpose, and 
other circumstances. 
Under section 3( 4)(a) the Office of Film and Literature Classification must consider 
the dominant effect of the publication as a whole. Dominant effect is likely to be the 
effect on the minds of the persons exposed to the publication.96 It is not the 
dominant content although it does have a necessary relationship with content. With 
pornographic material this is likely to be sexual arousal from looking at photographs 
containing nudity or sexual activity or reading about such activity. With other kinds 
of material the dominant effect on the minds of persons exposed is likely to be less 
clear. How can an expert body assess what the dominant effect is on the mind of the 
persons likely to be exposed to the publication? Possibly this is the reason for 
section 3(4)(d) (persons for whom the publication is intended) and perhaps the two 
paragraphs are to be read together. It seems that here again, community standards 
must be had regard to in interpreting this paragraph. 
95 Seen 27, 466. 
96 
Society for Promotion of Community Standards Inc v Waverley International (1988) Ltd [1993] 2 NZLR 
709, 718. 
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It is current classification practice to classify publications containing explicit sex 
intended to sexually arouse as at least objectionable unless restricted to persons who 
have attained the age of 18 years. There is no legislative requirement that 18 be the 
age at which such material is deemed not to be harmful, but it is a current 
convention of New Zealand censorship practice and reflects the community 
perception that such material is harmful to society if made available to persons under 
18 years. 
As section 3(4)(a) appears to be a key provision in the Act, it might be helpful if 
applying the Act to the publication started at this point. Having arrived at a 
tentative classification based on dominant effect (having regard to section 3(1)), any 
particular references that cause concern could be considered under sections 3(2) and 
(3) as to whether they affect the classification decision tentatively arrived at under 
section 3(4)(a). It does not appear to be necessary to establish that an element in a 
publication is its dominant effect for a publication to be objectionable or restricted. 
(vi) Impact of the medium: Section 3(4)(b) of the Act says that the impact of the 
medium is something that must be taken into account. 
In Butler Gonthier J (in agreement with the decision of Sopinka J) observed: 
97 
The likelihood of harm and the tolerance of the community may vary according to the 
medium of representation even if the content stays the same. 
In other words, the impact of the medium (or any other section 3(4) item for that 
matter) having regard to community standards can affect the classification of a 
publication, ie can affect whether there is more or less censorship. 
It would be tempting to use section 3(4) as a list of questions to be answered. 
However, it could be said that an appropriate interpretation is to deal with these 
matters so as to say whether they affect the classification decision tentatively arrived 
97 Seen 27,494. 
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at under section 3(4)(a). For example, when considering the character of a 
publication under section 3(4)(c) the Office of Film and Literature Classification 
might find that the publication has merit. The relevance of having merit is that the 
publication may be transported from being restricted to persons over the age of 18 
to, for example, a different age restriction for persons using the publication for a 
particular purpose. 
Offence - Display 
Having classified a publication as a restricted publication, the Office of Film and 
Literature Classification must then consider the conditions under which it must be 
displayed. Restricted publications are likely to be required to be displayed in 
"premises, or a part of premises, set aside for the public display of restricted 
publications (whether or not articles other than restricted publications are also 
displayed in those premises or that part of those premises)".98 
43 
Before a publication can have a display condition attached to it, it must first be 
classified as a restricted publication. The implication of this is that offence appears 
to flow out of harm. This means that such purposes as the protection of children are 
primary purposes and avoidance of offence a secondary purpose. A practical 
problem is that a publication might be offensive to ordinary members of the public 
but unless it is harmful to society if made available to persons outside of the 
restricted class there can be no restrictions on its display. At first glance section 27 
appears to accommodate moral interests (supported by the liberal view that there 
9
x Section 27(4)(e) Film, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993. There is a problem with 
premises set aside for such display in that although it would appear that the intention of this is to 
relegate such material to what are commonly known as sex shops, such shops are not defined in 
that they are not Iicenced or registered. It appears then up to the Department of Internal Affairs 
inspectors to make a judgment as to the nature of premises, or whether a part of premises is set 
aside, in enforcing the Act when a classification decision has made section 27(4)(e) a condition of 
display. 
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shall be no offence in the marketing of publications) but on closer inspection 
accommodates them less than is first apparant. 
The test is not "good taste and decency" as it is in the Broadcasting Act 1989 but 
the effect seems to be similar. 
E Broadcasting- The Inconsistencies between Harm and Good Taste 
As stated, the Act only covers publications as defined. It therefore does not cover
99 
such matters as telephone services, videophones, computer bulletin boards, live sex 
shows (which the Crimes Act 1961 cover), and broadcasting.
100 
1 New technology 
Section 123(4) of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 which 
creehe offence of supplying objectionable publications says that a publication 
m y su lied by means of electronic transmission ( other than by broadcasting) . 
Thi eans that so long as the publication itself can be seized, ie the magnetic disk 
on which the information is stored, then the supplier commits an offence. This 
catches, for example, operators of sex bulletin boards - if the magnetic disk 
containing the material can be obtained. This is as far as the Act goes in dealing 
with the new technology. 
The Technology and Crimes Reform Bill 1994 (a Private Member's Bill) aims to 
deal with material not covered by the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification 
Act 1993, by regulating the electronic, satellite, and telephone transmission of 
99 See n 18, 8-10. 
100 
"Broadcasting" is broadly defined in the Broadcasting Act 1989 to include new forms of broadcasting 
technology. 
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objectionable sounds and images. 101 It aims to do this by allowing the Office of 
Film and Literature to examine such material, and by allowing the equipment of the 
broadcaster or receiver to be seized, and by allowing the Office of Film and 
Literature Classification to ask the New Zealand network telephone provider to 
disconnect the phone service of the provider of say a pornographic bulletin board, 
for example when the last digit is dialled. 
In Australia it has been said that governments around the world are having difficulty 
coping with the regulation of undesirable material being transmitted by new 
technology, and that the Australian Department of Transport and Communication 
believes that the only way to regulate is by international agreement. 102 
It is not the purpose of this paper to consider the implications of the new technology 
for the Act. 103 However, if material transmitted by the new technology cannot be 
regulated then it raises the issue of whether there is any point in having the Act. It is 
possible that any eventual change to the Act will come about, as has occurred in the 
past, due to the impact of regulating material transmitted by new technology. 
However there could be more emphasis on self regulation as is starting to appear 
with electronic access devices. Perhaps there may still be justification for having 
censorship legislation covering publications susceptible to censorship, even if only to 
provide a forum for the gauging of standards. 
101 It is similar to the "Exon Amendment" in the United States which seeks to make telecommunication 
carriers criminally liable if the telephone network is used to transmit indecent material. 
102 Senator Margaret Reynolds in a conference address "New Technology: What does this do for the 
argument on censorship and technology?" Censorship Issues: Law, Tech110/ogy and Effects, 27 - 28 May 
1993 (Brisbane: Griffith University and Queensland University of Technology). 
103 For a discussion of the new technology see n 28. 
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2 Broadcasting 
Under section 4(2) of the Broadcasting Act 1989 (which is the only limit imposed in 
relation to the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 on 
broadcasters) no broadcaster can broadcast a film classified as objectionable or 
broadcast parts of a film that have been excised under the Act. This means that (but 
for section 4(1)(a) of the Broadcasting Act 1989) broadcasters can broadcast films 
that are classified as unrestricted, restricted or which have not be classified at all. 
Section 4(1 )(a) of the Broadcasting Act 1989 imposes the overall standard on 
broadcasters which is that they maintain standards consistent with the observance of 
good taste and decency. This restricts many more programmes than if the standard 
were "injurious to the public good". The rationale underlying this standard is likely 
to be the pervasiveness of the medium and its accessibility to young children.
104 
One of the problems that has arisen is the screening by Sky Television of "adult" 
materiai. 105 Not all films shown on Sky have been classified in New Zealand and 
may not only contravene the standard of "good taste and decency" under section 
4(1)(a) but also the higher standard of "injurious" if they had been classified as 
restricted, or even be deemed to be "injurious" if they had been classified. So why is 
Sky able to continue screening such material when it is obviously in breach of 
section 4(1)(a)? Under section 7 of the Broadcasting Act 1989 the broadcaster can 
act on a complaint in respect of particular programmes and under section 8 the 
complainant, if still dissatisfied, can refer the complaint to the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority. Under section 13, the Authority can make various orders. 
104 See Federal Communications Commission v Pacifica Foundation 438 US 726 (1978). This was a 
decision of the United States Supreme Court. The FCC could regulate indecent material ie material which 
did not conform with accepted standards of morality. Indecent material can be compared to obscene 
material which appeals to prurient interest or longing. 
105 Seen 18, 9. 
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The assumptions are that there have been insufficient complaints and that the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority accepts that there is a case for lesser standards 
for pay television than for free-to-air television due to its reduced pervasiveness. In 
addition the following decision gives an indication of the Authority's attitude to such 
material. 
In the decision of the Broadcasting Standards Authority Smits v Sky Network 
Services Limited
106 
the Authority considered a complaint about a programme 
"Playboy Late Night/After Dark" broadcast by Sky Television at 10.45pm. It found 
that the programme contained nudity and explicit sex and breached standard P2' 07 
of the Code of Broadcasting Practice for Sky Television which related to good taste 
and decency. The Authority upheld the complaint but declined to impose an order 
under section 13(1) since it was the first complaint lodged against Sky. 
Although the Authority upheld the complaint, it seemed to do so on the basis that 
because the programme was at the outer limit of what was acceptable at any time on 
pay television it should have been screened much later so as to signal that it was 
outside of mainstream programming. 108 The description of the programme in the 
decision indicates that the programme had characteristics which if classified might 
have been classified as objectionable unless restricted to persons who have attained 
the age of 18 (ie as R 18). Despite the standard in section 4(1)(a) being "good taste 
and decency" the Authority would have allowed a programme to be screened late at 
night which if subject to the classification scheme might likely have been classified as 
objectionable unless restricted, although it did indicate that "soft porn" of the type 
106 
Decision No: 62/94, 15 August 1994. 
107 
"To take into consideration currently accepted norms of decency and taste in language and behaviour, 
bearing in mind the context in which such language or behaviour occurs." 
'
08 Seen 106, 6. 
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under consideration was at the outer limit. This shows that the two systems do not 
sit well together. 
The Authority did not uphold the complaint on the basis that it was discriminatory 
against women. The reasons of the majority were that the "average viewer" would 
not be encouraged to treat women differently as a result of seeing the programme 
because it was light hearted. It is unclear from the decision whether the majority 
decision is based on the proof approach rejected by the courts in previous censorship 
decisions, or on the harm principle, ie on the possibility of changed attitudes due to 
exposure to such material. The minority's approach bordered on the "harm" 
principle saying that the effect was to reinforce stereotypical notions about women. 
Both approaches do not sit easily with the overall test of good taste and decency. 
Sky argued that because it was using the New Zealand film rating system and 
because it was providing a service to subscribers it should not be subject to the same 
standards as free to air television. 
The Authority said: 109 
• 
• 
Standards under the censorship legislation are different from those that apply 
to broadcasters and it was inappropriate for Sky to rely on them. 
"Unless the legislation" (broadcasting) "is changed to specifically exclude Sky 
from its jurisdiction, Sky is obliged to observe those standards". 
As earlier stated, broadcasters are not subject to the Film, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993 except in the limited way outlined. In view of the fact that 
Sky wishes to contravene the broad section 4(1)(a) standard of good taste and 
decency it could be said that broadcast programmes should be subject to the 
narrower standard of injurious to the public good under the Films, Videos, and 
Publications Classification Act 1993. Not all films shown on Sky are classified and 
109 See n 106, 3-4. 
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without the requirement of classification for broadcasters, the broadcaster is acting 
as censor without the expertise of the Office of Film and Literature Classification in 
the programmes that it does broadcast. It could be said that there is no problem 
with a broadcaster censoring on the basis of good taste and decency because that 
standard will prevent much material from being broadcast. However, if a 
broadcaster censors on the basis of injurious to the public good then it is doing so 
without the expertise of the state body established to perform that role. 
Should the standard for subscriber broadcast be different than for free-to-air 
television (ie should the standard be "injurious ' rather than "good taste and 
decency")?
110 
If broadcast films were subject to the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993 then there would be a strong argument that there should be 
so that Sky can compete with video stores and cinemas. Supporting the argument 
that is that the access devices to Sky (ie R-18 restriction cards and PIN numbers 
used with decoders, and scheduling details) amount to the equivalent of video stores 
and cinemas restricting access where that is a term of the classification and is 
consistent with the principle of reduced pervasiveness (and which amounts to self 
regulation). The Authority in Smits v Sky Television said 111 that subscriber 
television is subject to less parental control than a video store. Against this 
argument it could be said that once an R18 video is in a household, it is left to 
parental control as to who views it. 
Section 21(1)(e) of the Broadcasting Act 1989 which encourages the development 
by broadcasters of codes of broadcasting practice appropriate to the type of 
broadcasting practice taken recognises that there may be different codes of practice 
for different broadcasters. At present there is a Code of Broadcasting Practice for 
free-to-air television and one for pay television. This is difficult to reconcile bearing 
110 See n 18, 9. 
111 Seen 106, 4. 
in mind that the legislative standard under section 4(1)(a) applies to all broadcasters. 
The ability to have an appropriate code of practice does not extend under current 
legislation to being able to screen programmes which contravene the standard. An 
alternative argument is that the standard that applies is for that group of subscribers 
but this does seem to stretch the ordinary meaning of good taste and decency to a 
point not contemplated by the legislation. 
The two systems do not sit well together and there is scope for them to be 
rationalised to the extent practicable. 
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V THE BALANCE BETWEEN FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND 
FREEDOM FROM HARM 
51 
The Act can also be seen in terms of the balance between the freedom of expression 
and the freedom from harm. 
A International Instruments and Selected Countries 
International instruments and the laws of democratic societies promote the concept 
of freedom of expression. However, this freedom is not absolute. Many 
expressions of freedom of expression are limited by behaving in a moral way. 
1 International instruments 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights· reads: 112 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers . 
However this is limited by article 29 (2) which reads: 
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public 
order and the general welfare in a democratic society. 
Article 19(1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which gives effect to the Universal Declaration, is similarly worded and similarly 
limited by article 19(3). 113 
112 
Year Book of the United Nations 1948-49 (Department of Public Information, United Nations, New 
York). New Zealand was one of the countries that adopted the Declaration in 1948. 
111 Sec n 23. 
52 
2 Selected Countries 
(a) Canada 
Article 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms says that everyone has 
" ..... freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the 
press and other media of communication". This is comparable to section 14 of the 
NZ Bill of Rights Act and article 19(2) of the Covenant. 
Article 1 which limits article 2(b) reads:
114 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out 
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society . 
This is the same wording as section 5 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act and is comparable 
to article 19(3) of the Covenant. 
The 1992 Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Butler
115 confirmed that obscenity is 
a protected form of expression under the Canadian Charter and that section 163 of 
the Canadian Criminal Code which made it an offence to deal with obscene material 
violated the Charter. 116 However, the Court ruled that section 163 was 
constitutional, ie was a justifiable limit on freedom of expression, despite it violating 
Article 19(2) reads: 
"Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice." 
Article 19(3) reads: 
"The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are 
provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals." 
114 Sec n 26. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is supreme law. See art 52. 
11 5 Seen 27. 
11 6 Seen 27, 473. 
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the Charter. Although obscenity is protected Sopinka J said 117 that the kinds of 
things that underlie the protection of freedom of expression such as the search for 
truth do not include obscenity and that the fact that pornography is produced for 
economic profit supports this conclusion. However, unlike Miller (discussed 
shortly), he did not go so far as to say that obscenity was not protected. His line of 
thinking was directed at the reasons why obscenity as an expression should be 
restricted. 
He also rejected the argument that legislation banning obscene material should not 
exist and that it would be more effective to use such methods as education and 
legislation against discrimination on the grounds of sex. 118 He said that education 
and legislation are not alternatives but complements in addressing such problems. 
(b) United States 
Even in the United States of America where the First Amendment119 states that 
"Congress shall make no law .... "120 " ••••• abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press ........... " 121 the courts have held that the First Amendment does not 
protect obscenity (although it does protect serious works). The leading case on this 
is still the 1973 Supreme Court case of Miller v State of California. 122 In that case 
the defendant was prosecuted under the California Penal Code for mailing 
117 Seen 27, 481. 
118 See n 27,487. 
119 
This was proposed by the First Congress on 25 September 1789 to the legislatures of the several states. 
Sec JE Novak and RD Rotunda Constitutional Law (4 ed, West Publishing Company, Minnesota, 1991) 
1277. The United States Consitution is supreme law. 
1211 
United States Code Annotated, Constitution of the US Annotated Amendment l to 3, Annotations from 
Federal and State Courts (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1987) 7. 
12 1 
Seen 120, 176. 
122 
Seen 36. 
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unsolicited obscene material, ie obscene material which dealt with sex.
123 
It was 
held that the First Amendment did not protect (ie did not override) that part of the 
Code, ie that the state could regulate the distribution of obscene material. 
Expression must have value for it to be protected.
124 
There are some often referred to United States obscenity cases. In 1957 the 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not protect obscenity and that 
the state could therefore regulate obscene material.
125 
This was the first case 
presented to the Supreme Court that challenged obscenity on First Amendment 
grounds and Miller followed it and added the notion of merit.
126 
In 1969 the 
Supreme Court held that although the First Amendment does not protect obscenity 
it does protect the right of an individual to possess obscene material for private use, 
ie the state could not regulate obscene material for private use.
127 
However, in 
1973 the Supreme Court held that the state could regulate obscene shows at adult 
theatres. 128 In other words, it could prevent adults who consented to viewing those 
shows from viewing them. There was a public nuisance aspect to this. In 1978 the 
Supreme Court held the the Federal Communications Commission could prohibit the 
broadcast of indecent material. 129 This was on the basis of the pervasiveness of 
broadcast material which could be viewed by children. 
123 Seen 36, 430-431. 
124 " ••• •• •• •• ••••• to equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial 
exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conceptions of the First Amendment". Miller v 
United States 37 L Ed 2d 419, 437. 
125 Roth v United States 354 US 476 (1957). 
126 Seen 36. 
127 Stanley v Georgia 394 US 557 (1969). 
128 Paris Adult Theatre v Slaton 413 US 49 (1973). 
129 Seen 104. 
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(c) New Zealand 
B 
Section 14 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act is modelled on article 19(2) of the 
Covenant. Section 5 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act limits section 14. 130 
The Influence of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Act 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and its right to freedom of expression under 
section 14 does not override legislation and therefore does not override the Films, 
Videos, and Publications Classification Act when the intention of that Act is clearly 
stated. 
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Unlike in the United States, the subject matter that comes before the Office of Film 
and Literature Classification is "expression" and the Act can therefore be considered 
in the context of a restriction on freedom of expression. It is in this international and 
national context of freedom of expression not being absolute, ie limited by what is 
loosely called morality, that the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 
1993 was enacted. 
130 Section 14 reads: 
"Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information and opinions of any kind in any form ." 
Section 5 reads: 
"Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be 
subject only lo such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society." 
Section 4 (paraphrased) says that the NZ Bill of Rights Act does not override other legislation, ie the NZ 
Bill of Rights Act is not supreme law. 
Section 6 (paraphrased) says that if legislation can be given a meaning consistent with the NZ Bill of 
Rights Act then that meaning is to be preferred. 
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1 No influence if classification decisions are based on the Act 
Since the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is not supreme law, its application to 
the Act will be at the classification decision stage. 
If a person argues that section 14 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act applies to a 
classification decision, the Chief Censor must establish 
131 3 matters under section 5: 
• The limit as imposed by the classification decision is reasonable. 
• The limit is prescribed by law. 
• The limit is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
W. Hastings concludes that a classification decision is: 
132 
• Reasonable if it is no wider than is necessary. (This appears to equate with 
the concept of minimal impairment as discussed in Butler and discussed 
• 
• 
shortly.) 
Prescribed by law if it is based on statutory criteria (as outlined in section 3) 
and not guidelines. This is discussed in Butler. 
Demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society if it relates to 
morality (because, as previously outlined, most free and democratic 
societies restrict material which is contrary to public morality). (This 
appears to equate with the concept of "pressing and substantial" again 
discussed in Butler.) 
He concludes overall that in these circumstances it will be difficult to challenge a 
classification decision through the Court on the basis of the NZ Bill of Rights Act. 
131 R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200, 225. "The onus of proving that a limit on a right or freedom 
guaranteed by the Charter is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society rests 
upon the party seeking to uphold the limitation." This is a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
132 WK Hastings "The New Zealand Bill of Rights and Censorship" (1990) NZU 384, 387. 
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(a) 
A point to add is that if a classification decision could have gone either way then 
section 6 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act would apply to override the decision. 
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One of the issues considered in Butler 133 was whether a section of the Criminal 
Code of Canada which made it an offence for persons to deal with obscene 
publications was demonstrably justified under the Charter as a reasonable limit 
prescribed by law. Despite the fact that that case dealt with whether legislation (the 
Code) was constitutional in terms of the Charter, an issue which does not arise in 
New Zealand, and also was only concerned with material of a sexual nature due to 
the wording of the Code, the reasons relating to the interpretation of article 1 of the 
Charter can be applied to decisions made under the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993. This decision extends Hasting's analysis in that it adds 
"rational connection" and "balance". 
Prescribed by law 
Sopinka J in Butler134 said that the test was whether the legislation provided "an 
intelligible standard according to which the judiciary must do its work". Because 
the question of consitutionality of legislation does not arise in New Zealand, the test 
of prescribed by law, as Hastings135 points out, can be adapted to whether the 
censorship decision is based on the statutory criteria. This seems to reduce to 
whether the judgment of the Office of Film and Literature Classification was 
exercised correctly. 
133 Sec n 27. 
134 Seen 27,475 following Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Allomey-General) (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 577. 
135 See n 132. 
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(b) Reasonable and demonstrably justified 
In discussing whether a limit (ie a restriction) is reasonable and demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society Sopinka J followed a 2 part test. This 
involved reading "reasonably" and "demonstrably" together. 
• Part I of the test is whether there is a pressing and substanial objective to 
justify overriding the freedom. In this case the objective was the avoidance 
of harm. 
• Part II of the test is whether the limit taken to override the freedom is 
proportional to the objective. Part II of the test has 3 parts: 
1. Whether there is a rational connection between the limit and the 
objective. 
2. Whether the limit minimally impairs the right or freedom. 
3. Whether there is a balance between the effects of the limit and the 
objective. (Perhaps this could be alternatively expressed as to whether 
the benefits of the objective justify the costs of the limits.) 
Part I of the test is that the limit must be of sufficient importance (ie have a pressing 
and substantial objective) to justify overriding the freedom. Sopinka J said: 
• 
• 
The purpose of section 163 of the Canadian Criminal Code was avoidance of 
harm to society (ie harm being antisocial attitudinal changes caused by exposure 
to obscene material 136 ) . His view that the objective of the relevant section of the 
Criminal Code was the avoidance of harm was not considered in the lower court. 
The avoidance of this harm by restricting obscene material was a pressing and 
substantial concern. 
His reasons for saying that the avoidance of harm by restricting obscene material 
was a pressing and substantial concern were: 
136 Seen 27, 478. 
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The Supreme Court had previously recognised in its prevention of hate 
literature that certain materials cause harm by offending the values 
fundamental to society and that this harm is a substantial concern which 
justifies restricting the otherwise full exercise of the freedom of 
expression.
137 
Gonthier J later expanded this 138 saying that it is not a 
restriction based merely on like or dislike but based on some concrete 
problem such as life or harm. 
That legislation that suppresses obscenity is found in most free and 
democratic societies. 
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• That the legislation was consistent with Canada's international obligations ie 
the Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene 
Publications
139 
and the Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation 
of and Traffic in Obscene Publications. 140 
• That the increase in pornography renders the concern even more pressing 
and substantial than when the legislation was first enacted. 
His analysis supports the basis for the New Zealand Act (avoidance of harm being a 
pressing and substantial concern, consistent with the approach taken in other 
democratic societies and with international obligations, and addressing the concerns 
expressed about the worsening excesses of pornography 141 ). 
His analysis also supports the basis for classification decisions based on that Act in 
that if a classification decision is based on the statutory criteria (applying community 
standards of what is harmful) then it cannot be overturned on that part of the test. 
Again, this is a question of judgment. 
137 Seen 27, 479. 
138 See n 27, 498. 
139 Also in force for New Zealand (from 14 October 1950): NZTS 1950 No. 4, A.15. 
140 Also in force for New Zealand (from 28 October 1948): NZTS 1948 No. 15, A.10. 
141 Seen 8. 
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Gonthier J added 142 that comprised in the phrase "pressing and substantial" is the 
need for a wide consensus among holders of different conceptions of good as to 
what is not good. 
As to the 3 aspects of part 2 of the test (proportionality), he analysed 
143 
rational 
connection in terms of proof and concluded that although it is not possible to prove 
the connection between exposure to pornographic images and changes in attitudes, 
it is reasonable to presume that there is a connection. What he is saying is that the 
risk of harm to society is what society reasonably perceives to be the risk of harm. 
In support of proof not being required he cited the United States Supreme Court 
case of Paris Adult Theatre Iv Slaton. 144 His conclusion that proof is not required 
is the same as in Gordon v Gotch 145 although the reasons are different. He does not 
rely on the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts but on society's 
reasonable perception of the risk of harm. Essentially this comes down to the same 
thing because the Office of Film and Literature Classification in making its judgment 
must assess what society reasonably perceives to be the risk of harm. 
It is interesting that section 4 of the Act can be seen as dealing with the rational 
connection part of the test. Again, applying the principles in the case to the New 
Zealand situation, it comes down to classification decisions being based on the 
statutory criteria applying community standards. 
He analysed minimal impairment in relation to the legislation not restricting 
sexually explicit erotica146 without violence that is not degrading or dehumanising 
142 Seen 27, 498. 
143 Seen 27, 482-484. 
144 Seen 128, 60-61. 
145 Seen 53. 
146 
Seen 71, 15 which referred to the Canadian case of R v Wagner in which erotica was defined as 
"positive and affectionate human sexual interaction between consenting individuals participating on the 
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(which as previously outlined is also the case with the New Zealand Act). Again this 
reduces to what society reasonably perceives to be the risk of harm. Gonthier J, 
who agreed with Sopinka J's analysis, expanded this and said that the impact of the 
medium can be relevant to this point. It is likely that if a classification decision 
classified sexually explicit material per se between adults as objectionable then it 
would be wider than necessary and contravene the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990. However, as stated earlier, such material is likely in New Zealand to be 
classified as objectionable except if restricted to persons who have attained the age 
of 18 years. 
He also analysed it in relation to the defence of merit allowed by the Canadian 
legislation (merit is something that must be considered in section 3(4)(c) of the New 
Zealand Act although it is not stated to be a defence). 
He also analysed it in relation to the Canadian legislation not defining obscenity 
more precisely. He said: 147 
It seems that the only practicable alternative is to strive towards a more abstract definition of 
obscenity which is contextually sensitive and reponsive to progress in the knowledge and 
understanding of the phenomenon to which the legislation is directed. 
This is the approach which the New Zealand legislation takes. It avoids the 
"shopping list" approach which does not change with time and which may catch 
items which ought not to be caught. It focuses on context. 
This analysis of minimal impairment supports Hasting's 148 point about a decision 
being no wider than is necessary. 
participating on the basis of equality". However, this element of affection appears to impose a subjective 
view of what sexuality should be. Possibly Sopinka J was using the term merely to distinguish harmful 
pornography from harmless (ie non exploitative) pornography. 
147 
Seen 27, 485 . 
148 
Sec n 132. 
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He assessed the balance between the effects of the limiting measures and the 
legislative objective (the legislative objective being the avoidance of harm) as being 
the greater the intrusion, the more important the objective needs to be. He analysed 
it in terms of pornographic expression not being the kind of expression which the 
Charter seeks to protect which is the search for truth, participation in the political 
process and individual self-fulfilment and that the objective of the legislation is of 
fundamental importance in a free and democratic society .
149 
See the discussion 
under limits on freedom of expression (Canada) earlier in this paper. Again, this 
supports Hastings point (which was based on international obligations and how 
other countries treat expression contrary to morality) that freedom of expression 
does not include the freedom to express matters contrary to morality, morality in 
these circumstances being more than dislike, but what is harmful. This seems to 
indicate that pornographic expression because of its lesser value can be intruded 
upon to a greater extent, and gets back to merit. 
He concluded for the above reasons that the legislation was a reasonable limit on on 
freedom of expression. 
New Zealand case law: The 1992 New Zealand Court of Appeal decision Ministry 
of Transport v Noort150 was concerned with the consistency between the 
breath/blood test provisions of the Transport Act 1962 and the right to consult a 
lawyer under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The convictions were 
quashed because the defendants had not been told of their right to consult a lawyer. 
The Court dealt with how sections 4, 5 and 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 related to each other but the 5 judges used three different approaches. 
However, all three approaches adapted the right conferred by the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 to the enactment (the Transport Act) so that the objective of the 
149 See n 27, 481. 
ISO (1992] 3 NZLR 260. 
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enactment would not be interfered with. In other words, the same conclusion was 
reached by different reasoning. In limiting the freedom, the Court was concerned 
with what was reasonable in the circumstances. This goes back to section 5 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act with rights being subject to reasonable limits and 
this in turn gets back to the 2 part test used in Butler which Richardson J 
supported. 
151 
Although the Court of Appeal did not refer to Butler (the Supreme 
Court case of Butler is dated 2 months before Noort) Richardson J approved of 
another Canadian case that used the same test. 
Richardson J said: 152 that it was a matter of weighing: 
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(1) the significance in the particular case of the values underlying the Bill of Rights Act; 
(2) the importance in the public interest of the intrusion on the particular right protected by 
the Bill of Rights Act; 
(3) the limits sought to be placed on the application of the Act provision in the particular 
case; and 
( 4) the effectiveness of the intrusion in protecting the interests put forward to justify those 
limits. 
It is not clear how these matters to be weighed translate to the Canadian criteria. 
However in both cases it could be said that it comes down to the freedom on the 
one end of the seesaw, the objective on the other, and the limit balancing the two by 
reason of the limit's minimal impairment of the freedom on the one hand and the 
limit's rational connection to the objective on the other. 
There appears to be support for the view that if a classification decision is based on 
the criteria of the Act, ie that the nature of the publication clearly warrants the 
decision, then the NZ Bill of Rights Act will not be effective in overturning it. In 
other words, the interpretation of the Act in terms of a Bill of Rights analysis does 
not impose a more liberal interpretation on the Act. However, what it does add is a 
151 
Seen 150, 283 per Richardson J. 
152 
See n 150, 283. 
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necessary focus on the part of decision makers on the rights of persons submitting a 
publication, and that censorship must not be excessive. Section 38(2)(a) of the Act 
supports that focus by requiring the Office of Film and Literature Classification to 
specify the reasons for its decision. If there is doubt about the classification of a 
publication, then section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act would appear to apply for a 
decision to be made that favours the submitter of the publication. 
The case of Re Penthouse153 is of interest because it held that an age restriction on 
publications containing sexually explicit material was a justified limit on freedom of 
expression under section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, having regard to 
community standards. 
Unproved harm can justify restrictions on the freedom of expression. 
The above analysis indicates that the debate is about the balance between expression 
and harm, and not between expression and discrimination (two substantive rights in 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990). Discrimination is built into harm in the 
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993. 
2 The influence of international bodies - the possession offence 
(a) Significance for section 131 of objectionable under section 3 
Under section 3(2) of the Act which deems certain publications to be objectionable, 
a publication does not have to be classified as objectionable for it to be 
objectionable. However, the Court under section 29 of the Act would require the 
evidence of the Chief Censor as to whether the publication was objectionable. An 
unclassified publication would therefore need to be examined and classified before 
the Court would accept it as objectionable. 
153 See n 25 . 
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(b) Possession for a purpose not required 
Section 131 of the Act caused much discussion as the Bill was being debated. 154 
There was no possession offence under the repealed legislation. This meant that 
publications such as child pornography could be kept so long as they were not 
circulated. Under section 131(1), mere possession of an objectionable publication 
without any purpose is enough to establish an offence against the Act. Section 163 
of the Canadian Criminal Code has a possession offence but possession must be for 
the purpose of disseminating the material, eg publishing it. This is equivalent to 
section 123 of the Act. Section 163 does not extend to private viewing of obscene 
materials. 
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Sopinka t 55 rejected the argument that harm could be avoided by placing 
restrictions on access to obscene material. His reason was that the legislature has 
determined that certain acts are harmful and it would be hypocritical to say that 
restrictions on access would lessen the harm. However, the section of the Code 
seems to be inconsistent with Sopinka's view in that it is aimed only at dissemination 
of obscene materials and allows private viewing. One would think that if material 
was found to be harmful to society then being viewed by one person would still be 
harmful to society. On this aspect the New Zealand legislation differs from the 
Canadian legislation. In New Zealand, if a publication is objectionable (without 
restrictions) then it cannot be possessed for private viewing. The legislation catches 
not only the distributor, but also the consumer. This seems logical. Without 
consumers, distribution has no commercial purpose. Furthermore, if a publication is 
harmful to society then there is a risk that by allowing the owner to view it, that 
person's changed attitudes may harm society. Section 131 takes this view. 156 
154 
See for example, NZPD vol 532, 2 December 1992, 12765. 
155 
Seen 27, 486-487. 
156 
Under section 23(2)(c)(iii) of the Act it is possible for a publication to be restricted to one person. 
However, this appears to be qualified by section 23(3) which requires that publications limited to specified 
66 
(c) Lack of knowledge not a defence 
Section 131(3) says that lack of knowledge or lack of reasonable cause to believe 
that the publication was objectionable is not a defence. Lack of knowledge is also 
not a defence under sections 123(3), 125(3), 127(3), 129(2) and 130(3). 
( d) Significance of reporting to international bodies 
Although, as previously outlined, it is unlikely that the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
will have little influence on classification decisions that are made in accordance with 
the statutory criteria, New Zealand's requirement to report to the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee may influence the legislation itself. In its Third Report to 
the Committee 157 New Zealand reported that the Attorney-General had reported
158 
that the provision would be inconsistent with section 26 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (which says that retrospective criminal liability shall not be imposed 
and which reflects article 15 of the Covenant), and that the provision could not be 
justified under section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, but that Parliament decided to 
enact the provision. The section is retrospective because at the time of the charging 
with an offence, the classification decision would not have been made. Parliament 
decided to enact the provision because of the concern that child pornography was 
often found in the possession of child molesters, and also that in targeting the 
consumer the market for production of such material might dry up. The Committee 
responded 159 by expressing its concern over the vagueness of "objectionable" and 
persons be for educational , professional, scientific, literary, artistic, or technical purposes". If this is so, 
then objectionable publications cannot be limited to specified persons for their own use unless the use is 
one of the uses mentioned. 
157 Seen 87. 
15
R NZPD vol 532, 12757 - 12779, 2 December 1992, 12764 - 12765. 
159 Seen 87, 69 - 70. Report to Human Rights Committee. The Committee considered the third periodic 
report of New Zealand at its 1393rd to 1395th meetings (CCPR/C/SR. 1393 to SR. 1395) held on 23 and 
24 March 1995. 
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160 
made possession a criminal offence without knowledge. It 
suggested that "objectionable" be made more specific, or that criminal liability for 
possession without knowledge be removed. 
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New Zealand will reply to these comments and will no doubt explain the meaning of 
"objectionable". Change to "objectionable" is highly unlikely, because the test is 
repeated from previous law and also, as argued in this paper, has a sound basis. 
Change to the Act, if any, will be to section 131. A likely argument against change 
will be that the offence is not one of absolute liability where the defendant is 
convicted regardless of their state of mind but of strict liability in that the onus of 
proof is reversed from the prosecution to the defendant in that the defendant is only 
convicted if they cannot prove on the balance of probabilities they are not at fault. 
For example, if the defendant proves that the publication was "planted" in their 
house and they did not know of its existence then they would not be convicted. This 
is different from not having knowledge of the nature of the publication. This is 
consistent with section 131(6) which indicates that a defendant may have a defence. 
Section 25(c) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 states that a defendant has 
the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. Section 131, based on the 
previous argument, appears to be clear that the reverse onus applies and therefore 
section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act applies to override section 25(c). 
Section 131 assumes that people who know that a publication is in their possession 
should know what is objectionable. Only the most extreme material is deemed to be 
objectionable and based on the concept of community standards, the average person 
would know if such material was objectionable and therefore further notice is not 
160 
See n 87, 69. Report to Human Rights Commillee Section 131 is incorrectly referred to as section 121. 
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required. 161 However, whether a publication is objectionable is not necessarily clear 
cut, as evidenced by the fact that an expert body is needed to make a classification 
decision. The decision can be difficult to make and unpredictable, and can be 
overturned. Nevertheless it could be said that the purpose of the section (the 
protection of children) outweighs this disadvantage.
162 
Petition to United Nations Human Rights Committee: If a person felt aggrieved 
about their treatment under domestic law in relation to an offence under section 131 
they could petition the United Nations Human Rights Committee (under the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
163
) 
about the violation of their civil and political rights. The balance of freedoms in this 
regard could possibly swing towards the liberal view expressed in Stanley v 
Georgia. 164 
161 See Stewart J in the United States Supreme Court case oflacobellis v Ohio 378 US 184, 197 (1968) 
who said that he couldn't define pornography "But I know it when I see it". Referred to inn???????????? 
Constitutional Law 1140. 
162 See n 59, 52 which recommended that mere possession of refused classification material should not be 
an offence but that possession of child pornography should be because of its association with sex abuse. 
Aust Law Reform Commission Report 
163 NZTS 1989, No. 12, A 103. In force for New Zealand 26 August 1989. 
164 Seen 127. See also art 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and art 17 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, both of which relate lo unlawful interference with privacy or with the home. 
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APPENDIX 
SECTION 2 FILMS, VIDEOS, AND PUBLICATIONS CLASSIFICATION ACT 
1993: "Publication" 
2. Interpretation 
"Publication" means-
( a) Any film, book, sound recording, picture, newspaper, photograph, photographic 
negative, photographic plate, or photographic slide: 
(b) Any print or writing: 
(c) Any paper or other thing-
(i) That has printed or impressed upon it, or otherwise shown upon it, any word, 
statement, sign, or representation; or 
(ii) On which is recorded or stored any information that, by the use of any computer 
or other electronic device, is capable of being reproduced or shown as any word, 
statement, sign, or representation: 
SECTION 3 FILMS, VIDEOS, AND PUBLICATIONS CLASSIFICATION ACT 
1993: 'Objectionable" 
3. Meaning of "objectionable" - (1) For the purposes of this Act, a publication is 
objectionable if it describes, depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals with matters such as 
sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that the availability of the 
publication is likely to be injurious to the public good. 
(2) A publication shall be deemed to be objectionable for the purposes of this Act if the 
publication promotes or supports, or tends to promote or support, -
(a) The exploitation of children, or young persons, or both, for sexual purposes; or 
(b) The use of violence or coercion to compel any person to participate in, or submit to, 
sexual conduct; or 
(c) Sexual conduct with or upon the body of a dead person; or 
(d) The use of urine or excrement in association with degrading or dehumanising conduct 
or sexual conduct; or 
(e) Bestiality; or 
(f) Acts of torture or the infliction of extreme violence or extreme cruelty. 
(3) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not any publication ( other than 
a publication to which subsection (2) of this section applies) is objectionable or should be 
given a classification other than objectionable, particular weight shall be given to the 
extent and degree to which, and the manner in which, the publication -
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(a) Describes, depicts, or otherwise deals with-
(i) Acts of torture, the infliction of serious physical harm, or acts of significant 
cruelty: 
(ii) Sexual violence or sexual coercion, or violence or coercion in association with 
sexual conduct: 
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(iii) Other sexual or physical conduct of a degrading or dehumanising or demeaning 
nature: 
(iv) Sexual conduct with or by children, or young persons, or both: 
(v) Physical conduct in which sexual satisfaction is derived from inflicting or 
suffering cruelty or pain: 
(b) Exploits the nudity of children, or young persons, or both: 
(c) Degrades or dehumanises or demeans any person: 
(d) Promotes or encourages criminal acts or acts of terrorism: 
( e) Represents (whether directly or or by implication) that members or any particular class 
of the public are inherently inferior to other members of the public by reason of any 
characteristic of members of that class, being a characteristic that is a prohibited ground of 
discrimination specified in section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act 1993. 
( 4) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not any publication ( other than 
a publication to which subsection (2) of this section applies) is objectionable or should be 
given a classification other than objectionable, the following matters shall also be 
considered: 
(a) The dominant effect of the publication as a whole: 
(b) The impact of the medium in which the publication is presented: 
(c) The character of the publication, including any merit, value, or importance that the 
publication has in relation to literary, artistic, social, cultural, educational, scientific, or 
other matters: 
( d) The persons, classes of persons, or age groups of the persons to whom the publication 
is intended or is likely to be made available: 
(e) The purpose for which the publication is intended to be used: 
(f) Any other relevant circumstances relating to the intended or likely use of the 
publication. 
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